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In the Court of Appeals 
State of Utah 
BRIAN HIGH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Co-Defendant and Appellant, 
vs. 
R.D. 
Co-Defendant and Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
Comes now Appellee R.D., a Utah partnership, by and through its counsel, 
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake, a Utah professional corporation, and responds to 
Appellant Brian High Development Corporation's brief on appeal. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)Q) (1953, as amended), and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) 
(1953, as amended). This appeal was originally filed in the Utah Supreme Court and 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4) (1953, 
as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in finding no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
therefore granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee as a matter of law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment, the court 
inquires "whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Arrow Industries. 
Inc. v. Zions First Nat'l Bank. 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). The court reviews "the 
facts and inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the losing party." 
English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989). "[T]he Court treats the 
statements and evidentiary materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive them 
as the only credible evidence and sustains a judgment... if no issues of fact which 
could affect the outcome can be discerned." Arrow Industries. Inc. v. Zions First 
National BanK, 767 p.2d at 937. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is determinative in this action, 
and it states in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee R.D. ("R.D.") sold certain real property to Steve Sevy, as Trustee for 
undisclosed beneficiaries. According to the purchase agreement, periodic payments 
were to be made for purchase of the property and an escrow was established with 
Security Title Company of Southern Utah ("Title Company"). Steve Sevy transferred 
both the property and debt thereon to Appellant Brian High Development Corporation 
("Brian High") before the full purchase price was paid. Subsequently, Brian High 
defaulted on payments and R.D. demanded that the Title Company enforce the default 
provisions of the purchase agreement and escrow. The Title Company refused and 
began this action as an interpleader with a request for declaratory judgment. Brian 
High and R.D. were joined as co-defendants. During the course of the litigation, the 
Title Company entered into a settlement agreement with R.D., and the litigation 
continued on R.D.'s cross-claim against Brian High. R.D. moved the court for summary 
judgment against Brian High. On July 11,1990, and after several hearings on R.D.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, summary judgment was entered against Brian High in 
the Fifth District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, by District Court Judge J. Philip 
Eves. Brian High has appealed from that judgment. 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
Identification of Persons Involved 
The plaintiff in the action below was Security Title Company of Southern Utah 
("Title Company"), which is a Utah corporation doing business as a title insurance 
company and escrow agent in Iron County, State of Utah. 
Appellee R.D. ("R.D.") is a Utah general partnership. Robert L Brayton 
("Brayton") is a general partner in R.D. 
Steve Sevy ("Sevy"), is an individual residing in Iron County, State of Utah, and 
was a party to the property agreement as a Trustee for certain beneficiaries whose 
complete identities are not presently known. 
Appellant Brian High Development Corporation ("Brian High"), is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Iron County, State of Utah. Burton K. Nichols ("Nichols") 
was the President of Brian High. 
Agreement for Sale of Property 
On or about March 1,1980, R.D. entered into an agreement ("Agreement")1 to 
sell certain property ("Property") situated in Iron County, Utah, which Property is more 
particularly described as follows: 
The Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; the Southeast Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter and the Southwest Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake 
Meridian. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all oil, gas and mineral rights. 
1
 R. Vol. I, p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2. The Addendum contains all documentation (i.e., pleadings and 
exhibits) submitted by R.D. in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, as well as the Judgment, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. The Addendum is arranged in chronological order based on the date of the pleading--not on 
the date of the separate exhibits which were originally attachments to the individual pleadings. 
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Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in 
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved the 
water from Water User's Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963, with the State 
Engineer's Office on Spring No. 3, together with an easement to 
construct and maintain a pipeline over and across the Northwest Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 1 and twenty (20) gallons per 
minute of the water from Water User's Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963, 
with the State Engineer's Office, on Spring No. 1, and an easement to 
construct and maintain a pipeline over and across the Northwest Quarter 
of the Southeast Quarter and the North half of the Southwest Quarter of 
said Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian.2 
The Agreement was entered into between Appellee R.D. as "Seller," and a 
person named Steve Sevy as "Buyer" and as Trustee for certain beneficiaries whose 
complete identities are not known. The Agreement was for transfer of the Property 
which included appurtenant water rights as described above. According to the terms 
of the Agreement, Sevy agreed to purchase the Property for a total purchase price of 
$360,000.00. A $72,000.00 down payment was to be made at the time the Agreement 
was executed. Annual installments were to be made in the amount of $75,000.00, 
beginning March 1, 1981, and continuing thereafter until the entire principal balance 
and accrued interest had been paid in full. All payments were to be applied first to the 
payment of interest and second to the reduction of principal. Interest was to accrue 
from March 1,1980, on all unpaid portions of the purchase price at the rate of 10% per 
annum. As payments were made, certain portions of the land were to be transferred to 
Sevy, as provided in Section 3, subsection (a) of the Agreement: 
BUYER shall be entitled to receive from Trustee and SELLER hereby 
agrees and Trustee is hereby instructed to convey to BUYER one acre by 
Special Warranty Deed for each $3,000 paid by BUYER upon the 
principal balance due hereunder. • * • * 
2
 The water rights are the important part of the legal description. The appurtenant water rights involve 
Diligence Claim 1104, and the source of water rights set forth in Diligence Claim 1104 consists of three Springs 
identified as Spring No. 1, Spring No. 2, and Spring No. 3. R. Vol. II, p. 468; Addendum Exhibit 37. 
Rights to Spring No. 3 were specifically reserved in the language of the deed, along with twenty (20) gallons 
per minute of the water from Spring No. 1. Many of the issues raised during the pendancy of this case in the trial 
court by Brian High involve Spring No. 1 which is also referred to herein as Salt Pile Spring. 
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Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Sevy and R.D. established an escrow 
with the Title Company, and executed Escrow Instructions3 and authorized the Title 
Company to service the Agreement. R.D. delivered a Warranty Deed4 conveying the 
Property to the Title Company as Trustee. 
Sevy Transfers Interest to Brian High 
On or about April 11,1983, Brian High became the successor to Sevy's interest 
in the Property and assumed the obligation under the Agreement.5 Sevy conveyed to 
Brian High his interest in the Property by Warranty Deed.6 In addition, Sevy purported 
to assign his interest and obligation as Buyer to Brian High and the latter accepted the 
same, although to R.D.'s knowledge, no written agreement evidencing the assignment 
exists. Brian High has, nonetheless, consented and admitted to such assignment.7 
Default Under the Agreement 
The scheduled payments were made in 1981, 1982, and 1983, and the Title 
Company conveyed to Brian High a total of 31 acres of the Property. Brian High failed 
to make the April 1984 payment when due;8 therefore, Brian High defaulted in its 
payment obligations under the Agreement. Accordingly, and pursuant to Section 7 of 
the Agreement, R.D. sent a written and timely Notice of Default to the Title Company.9 
Amendment 
On or about April 19, 1984, and subsequent to the default, R.D. and Brian High 
executed an amendment ("Amendment") to the Agreement10 whereby R.D. 
relinquished Brian High's default in consideration for Brian High's two-fold promise: 
3 
4 
5 
6 
/ 
8 
9 
10 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
R. Vol. I 
I, p. 147; Addendum Exhibits 
, p. 146; Addendum Exhibit 3. 
I, p. 142; Addendum Exhibit 2. 
, p. 149; Addendum Exhibits. 
, p. 40; Answer f2 (admission). 
, p. 40; Answer f3 (admission). 
I, p. 150; Addendum Exhibit 6. 
I, p. 152; Addendum Exhibit 7. 
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A. Payment on June 1, 1984, of the remaining unpaid principal 
balance under the Agreement of approximately $135,078.00, plus 
accrued interest at 10% per annum from April 1,1983, and 
B. No acreage, except the thirty-one (31) acres previously conveyed 
to Brian High under the Agreement, would be conveyed to Brian 
High until such time as the entire unpaid principal balance and 
accrued interest were paid to R.D. 
The Agreement was to remain in full force and effect except as to those items 
specifically listed in the Amendment. 
Second Pefault 
Brian High failed to make the June 1,1984, payment as agreed in the 
Amendment.11 Pursuant to the default provisions of the Agreement, R.D. sent a written 
and timely Notice of Default12 dated June 1, 1984, to both Brian High and the Title 
Company. 
Under the terms of the Agreement, the occurrence of a default subjected Brian 
High to the following consequences: 
A. Cancellation of the Agreement; 
B. Reconveyance by the Title Company to R.D. of the portion of the 
Property not theretofore conveyed to Brian High; 
C. Entitlement to costs and attorneys fees incurred by R.D. in the 
enforcement of default provisions and remedies (assessed against 
Brian High); and 
D. Forfeiture to R.D. of Brian High's previous payments as liquidated 
damages for Brian High's non-performance of the Agreement. 
Problems With The Title Company 
1 1
 R. Vol. I, p. 40; Answer f3 (admission that "scheduled payments have not been made for 1984 and 1985"). 
1 2
 R. Vol. I, p. 153; Addendum Exhibit 8. 
In a letter dated June 19,1984,13 R.D. informed the Title Company that Brian 
High had failed to make payments and cure the default within the ten (10) day period 
provided under the Agreement. R.D. made demand upon the Title Company to 
enforce the default provisions of the Agreement and Escrow Instructions and reconvey 
to R.D. the portion of the Property not theretofore conveyed. 
The Title Company refused to cancel the Agreement and to reconvey the 
remaining portion of the Property out of trust to R.D., although R.D. was entitled to 
receipt of the remaining Property under the Agreement and Escrow Instructions on 
Brian High's default and R.D. had fully complied and performed its obligations under 
the Agreement. The Title Company based its refusal to carry out the default 
instructions on the basis that its legal counsel had advised the Title Company not to do 
so without either a mutual consent letter or a court order.14 
R.D. made subsequent demands for performance on the Title Company.15 
Finally, in a letter from the Title Company to Brian High, dated August 31,1984,16 the 
Title Company acknowledged its duty and obligation under the Agreement and 
Escrow Instructions to convey the remaining property to R.D. by reason of Brian High's 
default. However, in that same letter, the Title Company also purported to allow Brian 
High additional time to cure the default, which allowance had no basis in the 
Agreement or Escrow Instructions. 
In a letter dated September 4, 1984,17 five months after Brian High's initial 
default, and three months after Brian High's default under the Amendment, Brian High 
alleged that its default was justified because R.D. did not have proper title to water 
rights to be conveyed by the Agreement. Brian High claimed it had become aware of a 
1 3
 R. Vol. I, p. 155; Addendum Exhibit 9. 
1 4
 R. Vol. I, p. 157; Addendum Exhibit 10. 
1 5
 See, e.g., R. Vol. I, p. 158; Addendum Exhibit 11. 
1 6
 R. Vol. I, p. 159; Addendum Exhibit 12. 
17 R. Vol. I, p. 66; Brian High's Answer to Cross-Claim, f4 (admission as to "authenticity of documents" in 
response to R.D.'s Cross-Claim f 20, found at R. Vol. I, p. 23, alleging letter was sent). 
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water condemnation proceeding involving the water rights which were part of the 
Property.18 The condemnation action had been filed in the Fifth District Court of Iron 
County, Utah, and entailed the consolidation of two separate suits. Brian High claimed 
its default was justified because of the water condemnation actions. See "Facts" 
section on Water Litigation, infra. 
Interpleader Action Filed 
As a result of the conflicting demands and claims by R.D. and Brian High, the 
Title Company filed an interpleader action19 on June 7, 1985, and asked for 
declaratory judgment to establish the rights of the parties in relation to the Property. 
R.D.,20 Sevy,21 and Brian High22 answered the Title Company's complaint. In its 
answer,23 R.D. asserted a Counterclaim against the Title Company for its failure to 
cancel the Agreement and reconvey the property, and further, asserted a Cross-claim 
against Brian High based on the latter's default. Then, R.D. intervened in the case of 
Town of Brian Head vs, Parowan Reservoir Company, et al„ Civil No. 10599. 
INITIAL MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 26, 1988, the Title Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.24 
R.D. responded to the Title Company's motion for summary judgment and made its 
own motion for partial summary judgment against the Title Company, Sevy, and Brian 
High.25 The Title Company noticed its motion for hearing for May 17, 1988. 
The Title Company and R.D., through their respective counsel, appeared on 
May 17, 1988, before the court and argued their motions for summary judgment. Brian 
1 8
 R. Vol. I, p. 66; Brian High's Answer to Cross-Claim, f 4 (admission as to "authenticity of documents" in 
response to R.D/s Cross-Claim 1120, found at R. Vol. I, p. 23, alleging letter was sent but denying "legal 
conclusions"). 
1 9
 R.Vol. I, p. 1. 
2 0
 R. Vol. I, p. 23. 
2 1
 R. Vol. I, p. 40. 
2 2
 R. Vol. I, p. 40. 
2 3
 R. Vol. I, p. 23. 
2 4
 R. Vol. I, p. 99. 
2 5
 R. Vol. I, p. 126; Addendum Exhibit 1. 
High did not appear, and did not file any responsive pleadings or affidavits to the 
motions. The court entered summary judgment against Brian High, and ordered the 
Title Company to enforce the default provisions of the Agreement and Escrow 
Instructions. The court then continued to a later date the hearing upon the Title 
Company and R.D.'s motions for summary judgment against one another. 
At that later hearing, June 14, 1988, Attorney Michael Park appeared on behalf 
of Brian High and served counsel with the Affidavit of David J. Smith,26 who was the 
original counsel for Brian High, the Affidavit of Burton K. Nichols,27 and a 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment.28 Notwithstanding the 
fact that judgment had already been entered against Brian High nearly a month prior, 
and despite the lack of any motion to set that judgment aside, the court set the 
judgment aside and directed the parties to return the following month for a rehearing of 
all the motions. 
Prior to the complete rehearing, the parties submitted additional memoranda 
and affidavits. Brian High submitted a second Affidavit of Burton K. Nichols29 
purporting to raise an issue of fact as to Brian High's justification for defaulting under 
the Agreement by claiming R.D. had made representations about the quantity of water 
during the negotiations for the initial sale of the Property and that there was litigation 
pending involving the water rights included in the Property. R.D. filed a responsive 
memorandum30 and affidavits31 to dispel Nichols* assertions and demonstrate the 
lack of any factual dispute. On or about August 23, 1988, the court heard the motions, 
R.Vol. I, p. 175. 
R.Vol. I, p. 179. 
R.Vol. I, p. 185. 
R. Vol. I, p. 203; Addendum Exhibit 30. 
R. Vol. I, p. 209; Addendum Exhibit 14. 
R. Vol. I, p. 260, Addendum Exhibit 23; R. Vol. I, p. 257; Addendum Exhibit 24. 
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and denied them. Trial was set in this matter for June 7, 1989;32 however, it was 
postponed upon the court's own Motion to June 29, 1989.33 
Nichols Claims Parol Agreement 
In preparation for trial, counsel for R.D. scheduled the deposition of Burton K. 
Nichols, President of Brian High, to be taken on March 28, 1989. Nichols had 
conducted the negotiations with R.D. that culminated in the Agreement between R.D. 
and Sevy. In Nichols1 Affidavit34, he stated that he was the only individual who could 
testify on behalf of Brian High as to facts supporting Brian High's defense, which was 
that Nichols claimed that R.D. represented the sum total of the water rights being sold 
by R.D. which were to come from Salt Pile Spring as 136 acre-feet. It should be noted 
that these belated allegations were first raised by Brian High in August 1988, four 
years after Brian High's default under the Agreement and Amendment. 
R.D. has made timely objections to Nichols1 parol evidence about the quantity of 
water to be transferred under the Agreement and has repeatedly moved that his 
evidence be stricken on the grounds that it violates the parol evidence rule and lacks 
foundation. 
The language of the Agreement and Property description are clear; the 
language shows that it was agreed that the water rights being conveyed were those 
appurtenant to the land being transferred. The Property description refers to the water 
rights, in pertinent part: 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in 
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved 
[certain water rights]. 
32 
33 
34 
R. Vol. II, p. 407; Addendum Exhibit 28. 
R. Vol. II, p. 409; Addendum Exhibit 29. 
R. Vol. II, p. 411; Addendum Exhibit 30. 
The Agreement shows no attempt to state an exact quantity of water and the 
Agreement represents the entire agreement of the parties, as stated on Page 4, 
Section 10 of the Agreement: 
It is understood and agreed that there are no representations, covenants, 
or agreement between the parties hereto except as herein specifically set 
forth. 
Notwithstanding the obvious importance of Nichols1 testimony to Brian High's 
defense, counsel for R.D. was informed by Brian High's counsel in a letter dated March 
22, 1989,35 that Nichols would not submit himself to a deposition. In addition, in a 
conversation on the same date, counsel for Brian High assured counsel for R.D. that 
Nichols would not be a witness at trial.36 Brian High then agreed that Nichols would 
not be called by Brian High as a witness at the trial, and based upon that agreement, 
R.D. agreed to cancel Nichols1 deposition.37 
Attempted Settlement and Brian Hiah's Bankruptcy 
During the month of May, 1989, a settlement of R.D.'s claim against Brian High 
was attempted, but failed. Brian High thereafter attempted to compel R.D. to accept 
Brian High's settlement proposal by threatening to file bankruptcy. Three weeks 
before trial, counsel for R.D. received a letter dated June 7, 1989,38 from counsel for 
Brian High stating that unless R.D. would agree to release additional acreage from 
escrow to Brian High, Brian High would file bankruptcy. Attached to the letter was a 
copy of a fully completed and executed Petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy.39 R.D. 
rejected the ultimatum given in Brian High's letter. 
On June 22, 1989, only one week prior to trial, counsel for Brian High called 
R.D.'s counsel to state that Brian High had filed a Petition for Bankruptcy and that there 
R. Vol. II, p. 415; Addendum Exhibit 31. 
R. Vol. II, p. 403; Addendum Exhibit 27. 
R. Vol. II, p. 403; Addendum Exhibit 27. 
R. Vol. II, p. 418; Addendum Exhibit 33. 
R. Vol. II, p. 418; Addendum Exhibit 33. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
would be a motion with the Fifth District Court to stay the trial proceedings.40 On June 
27, 1989, only two days before trial, Brian High filed notice with the court that it had 
filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy proceeding, Case No. 89A-03796.41 On June 29, 
1989, the very day that trial was set, a stay42 was ordered in the case as to Brian 
High. 
Title Company and R.D. Settle 
On June 30, 1989, the Title Company and R.D. entered into a settlement 
agreement, and by court order dated July 10, 1989,43 R.D.'s counterclaim against the 
Title Company was dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
Dismissal of Bankruptcy 
During the pendancy of the bankruptcy, R.D. made a motion that Brian High's 
bankruptcy be dismissed. Brian High failed to file a response or to even appear at the 
hearing on the motion. On January 17,1990, the United States Bankruptcy Judge 
ordered44 that Brian High's bankruptcy be dismissed based upon finding that Brian 
High had not engaged in significant business activities since filing its petition and that 
the bankruptcy action was commenced primarily for the purpose of delaying the Fifth 
Judicial District Court action. 
Renewal of Summary Judgment Motion 
Then, R.D. filed a Motion for Reconsideration of R.D.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment45 based on the grounds that Nichols, the principal witness relied on by 
Brian High, had disclaimed any interest in the law suit and refused to testify,46 and that 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
R. Vol. II 
, p. 403; Addendum Exhibit 27. 
, p. 442; Addendum Exhibit 34. 
, p. 447; Addendum Exhibit 35. 
, pp. 383, 386. 
, p. 449; Addendum Exhibit 36. 
, p. 390; Addendum Exhibit 25. 
, p. 415; Addendum Exhibit 31. 
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the United States Bankruptcy Court had dismissed Brian High's bankruptcy which had 
been brought for tactical delay. 
Water Rights Litigation And Brian High's Defenses 
During the pendency of the trial court litigation, certain belated defenses were 
raised by Brian High in an attempt to justify and excuse its default under the 
Agreement and Amendment. One of those excuses, discussed above, was Nichols* 
claims of a parol agreement as to the quantity of water. The other excuses for default 
involve three court cases involving water rights, and Brian High has alleged that the 
water rights under the Agreement are in dispute because of the water rights litigation. 
The water rights litigation will be discussed chronologically in order of filing: the 
General Adjudication, the Troniers, and the Comprehensive Condemnation. 
General Adjudication 
There is pending a General Adjudication entitled In The Matter of the General 
Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water. Both Surface and 
Underground. Within the Drainage Area of the Beaver River—Escalante Vallev and All 
Tributaries, in Millard. Beaver. Iron. Washington. Kane, and Garfield Counties in Utah. 
Civil No. 4415. This was a general adjudication commenced by the State Water 
Engineer in 1967, "to determine the rights to the use of all the water, both surface and 
underground, within the drainage area of the Parowan Valley Division of the Beaver-
Escalante Valley."47 According to the Pretrial Order in that matter dated 1970, the only 
issue still pending as to Diligence Claim 1104 is ownership of certain stockwatering 
rights.48 The Property's irrigation and domestic watering rights comprising Diligence 
Claim 1104 are not disputed in the General Adjudication. 
The Property's appurtenant stockwatering rights are estimated at less than two 
acre-feet, which represents a very insignificant amount. Two independent experts 
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have confirmed that less than two acre-feet are still involved in the General 
Adjudication. 
R.D. submitted an affidavit from a water expert Kendrick J. Hafen49 who is 
licensed in the State of Utah as a registered land surveyor and an engineer-in-training 
since 1981 and an attorney since 1984. Mr. Hafen is familiar with the engineering 
principles and procedures utilized by the Office of the Utah State Engineer in 
quantifying water rights. Based upon engineering principles, the stockwatering right 
as to that portion of Diligence Claim 1104 appurtenant to the Property is less than 2 
acre feet of water. 
R.D. also submitted an affidavit from State Water Engineer Gerald W. Stoker,50 
who is also an expert in principles and procedures utilized by the Office of the Utah 
State Engineer in quantifying water rights. He concurred that the stockwatering right 
as to the subject Property is less than 2 acre feet and further stated that it was his 
opinion that the stockwatering right is valid and properly established by diligence use. 
In addition, it is important to note that Nichols was himself a party to the General 
Adjudication51 which began in 1967—long before Nichols negotiated the purchase of 
the Property with R.D; therefore, at the time he negotiated the purchase from R.D., 
Nichols was on actual notice of the issues in the General Adjudication involving 
Diligence Claim 1104. 
Tronier 
The second suit is a condemnation action filed by the Town of Brian Head 
against Gilbert and Madeline Tronier entitled Town of Brian Head vs. Gilbert R. Tronier 
and Madeline Tronier. Civil No. 10206. In that action, the Town sought to condemn Lot 
3, Block F, Cedar Breaks Homesite, Unit B. The Town alleged that it needed this lot 
R. Vol. I, p. 260; Addendum Exhibit 23. 
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because a spring was located thereon that was essential to the development of the 
Town's culinary water system. That spring was Spring No. 1 also known as Salt Pile 
Spring. Troniers claimed they owned water rights on Lot 3 from Spring No. 1 and that 
they owned appurtenant water rights on two contiguous lots (Lots 9 and 10), which 
rights had their source in Spring No. 1. Besides compensation for condemnation of 
the land, they sought compensation for the loss of water as to all three lots. 
However, Troniers did not claim exclusive rights in Spring 1—in their answer to 
the Town of Brian Head's complaint, Troniers stated: 
Defendants Tronier admit that there are other persons who own interests 
in water rights arising from springs located on the property of Defendants 
Tronier, and affirmatively allege that it is necessary to join said 
Defendants as parties to this action before a just adjudication of the 
subject matter of this action can be made.52 
Before this case was decided, and on June 27, 1984, the Town of Brian Head 
filed a comprehensive water condemnation action. Consequently, the Troniers1 action 
involving Lot 3 was resolved as follows:53 Summary Judgment was entered 
condemning Lot 3, the land only; the question of Troniers1 ownership interest in Spring 
No. 1 and entitlement to compensation therefor was reserved for and joined with the 
newly filed water condemnation suit and the Town was admonished to name all 
parties showing an interest in Spring No. 1 in the water condemnation suit. 
Brian High did not raise this as a defense until September 4, 1984 which was 
well after both of its defaults—April 1, 1984 and June 1, 1984. 
Comprehensive Condemnation 
The Town of Brian Head filed a comprehensive condemnation action 
"(Comprehensive Condemnation") to acquire water for the Town. That action was 
entitled Town of Brian Head vs. Parowan Reservoir Company. Parowan Reservoir 
Shareholders, and John Does 1 through 100. Civil No. 10599, commenced by 
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resolution of the Town Council of the Town of Brian Head on June 26, 1984. Note that 
the action was filed after both of Brian High's defaults—April 1, 1984 , and June 1, 
1984, and not even raised as a defense until September 4, 1984. 
The Town of Brian Head eventually abandoned its effort to condemn water 
rights, and accordingly, dismissed the Comprehensive Condemnation by Order of the 
Court dated November 17, 1987.54 However, the Order of Dismissal reserved one 
issue for later determination (hearing), which issue was Troniers1 right to receive 
attorneys1 fees from the Town of Brian Head. Nonetheless, the condemnation, itself, 
was abandoned and dismissed and thus no challenge remains as to the ownership of 
Spring No. 1. 
June 5th Hearing 
The hearing on R.D.'s Motion for Reconsideration was scheduled for June 5, 
1990, and the reporter's transcript is part of the record. At the June 5th hearing, 
counsel for Brian High appeared without any affidavits or other evidence and without 
having contacted the State Water Engineer but proffered testimony as to what he 
thought the State Water Engineer would say. Brian High's counsel urged that the 
testimony of the State Water Engineer would show that the water rights were tied up in 
litigation and that the Diligence Claim No. 1104 water rights were in dispute. Counsel 
for Brian High further urged that the Tronier claims to the water in the Comprehensive 
Condemnation created a dispute. Based on Brian High's representations, the judge 
decided he needed evidence from the State Water Engineer. 
R. Vol. I, p. 244; Addendum Exhibit 21 
So, counsel for R.D. and Brian High interviewed the State Water Engineer and 
an affidavit55 was submitted for the court. There was a hearing on June 19,1990, as a 
follow up to discuss the information from the State Water Engineer. 
June 19th Hearing 
The transcript of the June 19,1990, hearing is part of the record. The Affidavit of 
the State Water Engineer was discussed at the hearing. The State Water Engineer's 
records and engineering expertise showed that less than two acre-feet of 
stockwatering rights set out in Diligence Claim 1104 were left in dispute in the General 
Adjudication Suit. Accordingly, the judge found that fact (i.e., relating to the General 
Adjudication Suit) to be immaterial. For summary judgment, the disputed fact must be 
material and genuinely controverted to preclude summary judgment being entered. 
The judge stated, in pertinent part: 
THE COURT: It appears that the — the land was transferred with 
appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows that appurtenant water 
rights are available. And there's no legitimate dispute as to how much 
those — or the quantity of water that was involved.56 
All the issues which had been earlier raised by Brian High were again raised, 
discussed and dispensed with at the June 19th hearing. The court found no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and entered summary judgment as a matter of law against 
Brian High and in favor of R.D. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Summary judgment. Summary judgment should be granted when 
there are not genuine issues as to any material facts. Each of the issues Brian High 
raised in hopes of forestalling the entering of summary judgment were not genuine 
issues of material facts. 
55 
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Point II. No Defense or Justification for Default. The clear language of the 
contract explains that default occurs when payments are not made when due. Brian 
High has admitted to failing to make payments as agreed. Brian High has attempted to 
excuse its default by alleging two different theories. 
Parol Evidence. Nichols made claims of a parol agreement between 
R.D. and Sevy and its assignee Brian High as to the quantity of water. First, 
R.D. has always been ready, willing and able to transfer "appurtenant" water 
rights. Second, parol evidence is inadmissible because the language of the 
Agreement is not ambiguous. Third, Nichols is the only one (by his own 
admission) who can testify to this parol agreement and Brian High has agreed 
not to call Nichols as a witness at trial. 
Litigation Involving Water Rights. There are three law suits which 
Brian High would have the Court believe place the Property's water rights in 
dispute. However, the mere existence of these suits is immaterial, and does not 
challenge the water rights sold by R.D. Furthermore, the assertion of these suits 
as a defense or excuse was fatally belated—months after default. 
(a) The General Adjudication was begun in 1967, and as of 
1970, there are less than two-acre feet of stockwatering rights (not 
domestic or irrigation) pertaining to the subject Property which are still 
involved in the adjudication. Nichols himself was a party to the General 
Adjudication, as well as the negotiator of the Agreement with R.D., and 
was thus on actual notice of the General Adjudication long before the 
Agreement with R.D. was entered and the default occurred. 
(b) The Troniers' Condemnation, as such, has been dismissed 
with none of the water being condemned. Further, Troniers have 
admitted that others also own interest in Spring No. 1. 
(c) The Comprehensive Condemnation was not even pending 
when Brian High defaulted on payment. In 1987, the Town of Brian Head 
abandoned its efforts to condemn the water involved in the 
Comprehensive Condemnation, and all issues have been dismissed 
except the issue of Troniers' attorneys1 fees. 
(d) Pursuant to the doctrine of equitable conversion, the 
purchaser (Brian High) acquires all the incidents of ownership except 
legal title and therefore bears the benefits and losses that may accrue to 
the property such as a condemnation action. 
Point III The State Water Engineer, through his affidavit, was involved in 
the instant case in two capacities—he acted in an administrative capacity utilizing the 
records and procedures of his office and in the capacity of an expert witness. He did 
not act in an adjudicative capacity. Further, his affidavit was ordered by the court 
based on Brian High's urgings to the trial court. 
Point IV It is not necessary for the case to be remanded for the trial court to 
quiet title in the water rights to the property. Appurtenant water rights were available at 
all times pertinent hereto, as set forth in the Agreement, and no one disputes R.D.'s 
ownership in "appurtenant" water. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
To prevent summary judgment, a factual issue must be essential (i.e. material) 
to the resolution of the matter in controversy. Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
D A ^ c - i ^ 
and Procedure: Civil 2d §2725 (1983). In other words, "[a] dispute as to an 
immaterial fact does not preclude summary judgment. [Emphasis added.]" Id- Once it 
is determined whether certain facts are material, the court determines whether any of 
them are genuinely in dispute. To bring facts into dispute, there must be more 
asserted than the opponent's opinions and conclusions. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 
1170 (Utah 1983). Further, summary judgment is not precluded simply because some 
fact remains in dispute; the disputed fact must be material and "genuinely 
controverted." Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390 (Utah 1980); Keslerv. 
Kesler. 583 P.2d 87 (Utah 1978). 
At the final hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the transcript for the 
hearing bears out that the trial court judge found no genuine issues of any material 
fact. The pertinent part of the oral argument at the June 19, 1990, hearing went as 
follows:57 
THE COURT: I had indicated that the reason that I had denied the 
motion for summary judgment previously was that there appeared 
to be a factual dispute as to what was actually involved in the other 
cases where this water — these water rights may have been 
included. And it appears —at least I understood from our 
discussion — that of all the water appurtenant to this property, only 
two acre feet might be involved in some other litigation. 
MR. WADE [R.D.]: Less than two acre feet. And the state engineer's 
Affidavit states that his position is that the stock watering right, 
which is left at issue in that general adjudication, is valid as it is set 
out on that diligence claim. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Park, what is your position with regard 
to the motion for summary judgment at this point? 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: At the last hearing, I represented to the Court 
that there was a dispute concerning the water, and that the only 
one that could answer that dispute was the state engineer. And 
after Mr. Wade and I talked to the engineer and reviewed what he 
would say in his Affidavit, it was my opinion that maybe the Court 
would determine that the two acre feet in dispute was not a 
substantial breach of this contract; so, I didn't want to 
R. Vol. II, p. 545; June 19th Hearing Transcript, p. 3. 
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misrepresent anything to the Court, and that's why I don't object to 
this reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment. 
THE COURT: You're not stipulating that I should grant the motion 
for summary judgment? 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: That's correct. I did mention to the Court 
previously that — that there was one other issue that we could 
have raised or that may be in the file, and that's that Mr. Nichols 
claims in his Affidavit, that it was represented to him that there was 
136 acre feet of water with this property. 
THE COURT: And, in fact, there's only — what? — 20 or so acre 
feet? But as I understand it, you don't intend to call Mr. Nichols, 
and have so represented to counsel? And based upon that 
representation, he hasn't been deposed; is that correct? 
MR. WADE [R.D.]: That's correct, Your Honor. 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: That's correct. 
MR. WADE [R.D.]: Furthermore, we've briefed [... ] and argued to the 
Court that [... ] his Affidavit is a clear violation of the parol 
evidence rule. * * * * 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to grant the motion for summary 
judgment, it appearing that there's no material issue of fact that 
has been raised by the defense — or by the defendants to that 
motion for summary judgment. It appears that the — the land was 
transferred with appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows 
that appurtenant water rights are available. And there's no 
legitimate dispute as to how much those — or the quantity of water 
that was involved. 
The parties had ample time to brief the issues and the parties had more than 
five opportunities to appear before the trial court and argue their respective positions. 
In the final argument before the trial court, counsel for Brian High could not, when 
asked, supply the court with any material fact that was still in dispute. The judge 
clearly found there were no genuine issues of material fact, and entered summary 
judgment as a matter of law in Appellee R.D.'s favor. Appellee R.D. respectfully moves 
this Court to uphold the lower court's ruling. 
POINT II THERE IS NO VALID DEFENSE OR JUSTIFICATION FOR 
BRIAN HIGH'S DEFAULT UNDER THE AGREEMENT 
AND AMENDMENT 
Brian High has admitted that it did not make payments "in 1984 and 1985" when 
those payments were due.58 According to the Agreement,59 Section 7, default is 
when payments are not made when due. Brian High has raised several defenses 
during the course of the litigation, in order to excuse or justify its default under the 
Agreement and Amendment. Each of Brian High's attempted justifications for default 
has been fully addressed and disposed of by R.D. The alleged defenses or excuses 
can be summarized as follows: 
A. Nichols' parol evidence that R.D. had made representations that there 
were 136 acre-feet of water appurtenant to the land involved in the 
Property transfer to Sevy;60 and 
B. Litigation involving appurtenant water rights included in the Property, 
which suits are: 
(1) In The Matter of the General Determination of the Rights to the Use 
of All the Water. Both Surface and Underground. Within the 
Drainage Area of the Beaver River — Escalante Vallev and All 
Tributaries, in Millard. Beaver. Iron. Washington. Kane, and 
Garfield Counties in Utah. Civil No. 4415. 
(2) Town of Brian Head vs. Gilbert R. Tronier and Madeline Tronier. 
Civil No. 10206. 
(3) Town of Brian Head vs. Parowan Reservoir Company. Parowan 
Reservoir Shareholders, and John Does 1 through 100. Civil No. 
10599. 
None of the excuses or defenses justify Brian High's default. The amount of 
water "appurtenant" to the Property was quantifiable by standard engineering 
R. Vol. I, p. 40; Brian High's Answer, fl3. 
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principles when the Agreement was entered into. If exact quantity of water had been 
an important part of the Agreement, why was it not included in the language? 
Further, these alleged excuses or justifications for default were raised quite 
some time after default. Brian High's first default in its payment obligations occurred 
on April 1, 1984, and was resolved by the "Amendment to Trust Agreement" executed 
on April 19, 1984. Brian High did not attempt to justify the default by any assertions 
that water rights were questionable or that a water condemnation action might impact 
those rights.61 Brian High's next and enduring default occurred on June 1, 1984, 
when it again failed to make its payment as agreed to in the Amendment. Once again, 
there was no excuse given at or around the time of the default to excuse or justify non-
payment. R. D. gave the notice required in the Agreement allowing Brian High ten 
days to cure the default, and Brian High failed to respond either with a payment or an 
excuse. 
A. R.D. has at all times been capable of transferring the 
"9PPUrtengnt" wgfcr it ggreed tQ PQnvey in the Deed gnd 
Agreement 
The language in the Deed62 and Agreement63 as to the water portion of the 
Property description is as follows: 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in 
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved the 
water from Water Users Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963 with the State 
Engineer's Office on Spring No. 3, together with an Easement to 
construct and maintain pipe line over and across the Northwest Quarter 
of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 1 and twenty (20) gallons per 
minute of the water from Water Users Claim No. 1104 filed July 3, 1963 
with the State Engineer's Office, on Spring No. 1, and an easement to 
construct and maintain a pipe line over and across the Northwest Quarter 
of the Southeast Quarter and the North Half of the Southwest Quarter of 
said Section 1, Township 36 South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
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From this language it is "crystal clear," even "prima facie" clear, that the intent of 
the grantor, R.D., was to convey only that water which was "appurtenant" to the land 
being conveyed excepting those water rights specifically excluded from transfer. The 
term "appurtenant" is a legal "term of art" commonly used in deeds and real estate 
contracts to define or describe the character and extent of water and/or mineral rights 
passing to the grantee. Water is said to be "appurtenant" to the land upon which it is 
used when it is used in direct connection with the real estate and when it is necessary 
to the beneficial enjoyment of the land. Thompson v. McKinney. 91 Utah 89, 63 P.2d 
1056 (1937). The amount of water that is appurtenant to any particular tract of land is 
the amount which was beneficially used upon the land immediately prior to the 
conveyance. Stephens v. Burton. 546 P.2d 240 (Utah 1976); see also, Utah Code 
Ann. §73-1-11 (1953, as amended). There is nothing in the Deed or Agreement to 
suggest that any specific quantity of water was to be transferred, and from the 
description of the term "appurtenant" in the foregoing cases, use of that term in deeds 
and agreements does not imply any specific quantity. 
B. Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict a written 
agreement's clear and unambiguous terms 
Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or change a written agreement's 
terms which are clear, and unambiguous. E-A Strout Western Realty Agency. Inc. v. 
BroderiCk, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974); Boise Cascade Corp.. Bldg. Materials Distrib. 
Div. v. Stonewood Dev. Corp.. 655 P.2d 668 (Utah 1982). This same rule applies in 
the context of a legal description in a deed or contract. Where a deed is plain and 
unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary its terms. Hartman v. Potter. 
596 P.2d 653 (Utah 1979). Moreover, a description of property in a deed is prima facie 
an expression of the intention of the grantor. ]£. 
The case of Hartman v. Potter, supra, is particularly instructive here and similar 
on its facts to the case at hand. In that case, the original owner ("O.O.") of a 160-acre 
parcel of property owned all of the mineral rights thereon. O.O. conveyed a 1/2 interest 
in the mineral rights to one Bennett. Later, 0.0. sold the land to Hartman and in the 
warranty deed to Hartman, 0 .0 . reserved a 3/4 interest in all mineral rights. A person 
named Potter succeeded to O.O.'s interest. Hartman brought an action seeking to 
quiet title in himself to a full 1/4 of all the mineral rights that had ever existed on the 
160-acre parcel. Potter resisted by arguing that O.O.'s intent in reserving 3/4 of the 
mineral rights was to reserve O.O.'s full 1/2 interest (the other 1/2 having been 
conveyed previously to Bennett). The trial court entered summary judgment in Potter's 
favor holding that 0 .0 . had intended to reserve his full 1/2 interest in the mineral rights 
and had not intended to convey any fraction thereof to Hartman. That decision was 
vacated on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court noted that neither party had argued that 
the deed in question (0.0. to Hartman) was ambiguous. It therefore observed: 
In the absence of ambiguity, the construction of deeds is a question of 
law for the court, and the main object in construing a deed is to ascertain 
the intention of the parties, especially that of the grantor, from the 
language used. The description of the property in a deed is prima facie 
an expression of the intention of the grantor and the term "intention," as 
applied to the construction of a deed, is to be distinguished from its usual 
connotation. When so applied, it is a term of art and signifies a meaning 
of the writing. 
id, at 656. 
The Court cited the controlling rule with respect to the inadmissibility of Parol 
Evidence in the absence of ambiguity, thus: 
Deeds are to be construed like other written instruments and where a 
deed is plain and unambiguous, parol evidence is not admissible to vary 
its terms. ...It is also well known that the intention of the parties to a 
conveyance is open to interpretation only when the words used are 
ambiguous. 
Id, 
The Court held that the reservation language of the deed was clear and 
unequivocal, and therefore, as a matter of law the intent and effect of that language (to-
wit: reserving 3/4 of the mineral rights of O.O., grantor) was to convey a 1/8th interest 
in the minerals appurtenant to the total 160 acre parcel to Hartman, reserving a 3/8ths 
interest to O.O. since the extent of O.O.fs interest in the minerals at the time of the 
conveyance to Hartman was only a 1/2 interest. The Court's own language is 
particularly apt: 
Since Potters could not convey, except, or reserve more than they 
owned, and since the recital makes no reference to the already severed 
one-half mineral interest in Bennett no longer "belonging" to the land, we 
can only conclude that Potters excepted three-fourths of their fractional 
one-half interest in the minerals. Consequently, the deed in question 
conveyed a one-eighth mineral interest to plaintiffs and "reserved" to 
Potters a three-eighths interest, all of which, added to Bennett's one-half 
interest, comprises the whole mineral interest concerned. 
Jjt at 657-658. 
In the instant case, there has been no assertion that the language of the 
Agreement,64 and specifically the legal description therein, is anything but clear and 
unequivocal. Nor could such an argument ever be made in this case in good faith. 
Thus, the question as to the quantity and nature of water rights intended in the 
Property conveyance is one of law to be determined by the Court from the language of 
the Agreement description, only. The language of the Agreement is clear that R.D. 
intended to transfer its ownership in the "appurtenant" water. This intent is unaffected 
by Brian High's allegations that Nichols thought there would be 136 acre-feet of water 
involved in the conveyance and whether or not there may be litigation pending 
involving the "appurtenant" water rights. 
C. Nichols' parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the plain 
language of the Agreement 
The parol evidence adduced by Brian High in Mr. Nichols1 affidavit65 is clearly 
inadmissible, and is, moreover, in direct conflict with the plain language of the 
Agreement.66 Nichols claims67 he conducted negotiations with R.D. that culminated in 
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the Agreement between R.D. and Sevy, and that he was the only individual who could 
testify on behalf of Brian High as to facts supporting Brian High's defense that R.D. 
represented the water rights as 136 acre-feet. R.D. has made timely objections to 
Nichols1 parol evidence and has moved that this be stricken. 
The Agreement and Property description68 are clear as to what water rights 
were intended to be transferred: 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to, used upon or in 
connection with said property, except and there is hereby reserved 
[certain water rights]. 
The Agreement69 and its written language represent the entire agreement of the 
parties: 
It is understood and agreed that there are no representations, covenants, 
or agreements between the parties hereto except as herein specifically 
set forth. 
The intent of the parties is manifest in the Agreement and there is no need to 
resort to parol evidence to discover the intent of the parties. There have been no 
claims of ambiguity of the Agreement or Property description. The language of the 
Agreement speaks for itself, as Brian High claimed in its Answer, ^47° 
Furthermore, even if Nichols1 parol evidence were to be considered, Nichols 
has refused to submit himself to a deposition. Based on Nichols1 refusal, Brian High 
has assured R.D. that Nichols will not be a witness at trial71 and has stated the same to 
the trial court judge: 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: * * * I did mention to the Court previously that 
— that there was one other issue that we could have raised or that may 
be in the file, and that's that Mr. Nichols claims in his Affidavit, that it was 
represented to him that there was 136 acre feet of water with this 
property. 
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THE COURT: And, in fact, therms only — what? — 20 or so acre 
feet? But as I understand it, you don't intend to call Mr. Nichols, and have 
so represented to counsel? And based upon that representation, 
[Nichols] hasn't been deposed; is that correct? 
MR. WADE [R.D.] That's correct, Your Honor. 
Mr. PARK [Brian High]: That's correct. 
Nichols' claims are parol evidence and inadmissible because the language of 
the Agreement is clear and no one has alleged otherwise. Furthermore, because 
Nichols will not be a witness, there is no proof as to the alleged misrepresentation of 
the quantity of water to be transferred. 
D. The litigation involving the appurtenant water rights is no 
defense or excuse to justify Brian High's default 
Brian High attempts to excuse its default by pointing to three suits relating to the 
water rights appurtenant to the property to show, just like with Nichols' claims, that the 
quantity of water is in dispute. However, none of the suits is a valid defense or excuse 
for several reasons. 
First, as stated above, R.D. intended to transfer its interest in the appurtenant 
water rights—R.D. did not quantify its interest in the Agreement and if the specific 
quantity had been so important, Sevy or Nichols should have insisted that a specific 
quantity be stated in the Agreement. Evidence outside the Agreement, such as 
alleged parol agreements, has no affect on R.D.'s ability and intention to transfer its 
"appurtenant" water rights. 
Second, the facts of each law suit show that none of the suits provide a valid 
justification for default. 
General Adjudication. The litigation which was first in time was the General 
Adjudication for adjudication of water in the Beaver River drainage area. This action 
was commenced by the State Water Engineer in 1967 and the only issue as to the 
water rights involved in the Agreement is the ownership of certain stockwatering rights. 
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Those stockwatering rights consist of less than two acre-feet. The Property's more 
significant water rights, i.e., irrigation and domestic watering rights, are not in question 
in the General Adjudication. In addition, Nichols was himself a party to the General 
Adjudication long before he negotiated the purchase of the Property with R.D. and was 
therefore on actual notice of the existence of the General Adjudication and its issues at 
all times relevant herein. To say that the General Adjudication suddenly became an 
excuse for default in April 1984, or June 1984, after the General Adjudication had 
been pending for nearly seventeen years and Nichols, the President of Brian High and 
Agreement negotiator, was on notice of its existence and issues for seventeen years, 
is ridiculous. 
Troniers. The second suit was a condemnation action filed by the Town of 
Brian Head in September 1983, against the Troniers to acquire title to land and water 
rights in Spring No. 1 which is also a spring where some of the Property's water 
originates. That action was resolved as follows: summary judgment was entered 
condemning the land only, and the question of Troniers1 ownership interest in the 
spring (and therefore, any entitlement to compensation for condemnation of water 
rights) was reserved for and joined with a general water condemnation suit which had 
been brought by the Town. Troniers were not the only owners in the spring, which 
Troniers admitted in their answer in their individual condemnation—there are other 
people who own interests in the water originating from the spring. Furthermore, the 
Troniers1 action is no longer pending as an independent action. The Troniers1 suit 
does not provide a justification for default. 
Comprehensive Condemnation. The Town of Brian Head filed a 
comprehensive condemnation action to acquire water for the Town on June 27, 1984. 
This action was commenced nearly three months after Brian High's original default on 
April 1, 1984, and about a month after Brian High's default under the Amendment. The 
Comprehensive Condemnation was not even raised as an excuse for Brian High's 
default until September 1984. 
On November, 17,1987, the Town of Brian Head having abandoned its effort to 
condemn water rights, by order of the court, the general condemnation action was 
dismissed. By that order, the court reserved only one issue regarding Troniers for later 
determination, which issue was Troniers' entitlement to attorney's fees. There are 
clearly no issues involving water rights pending in this action. 
Equitable Conversion. With an enforceable executory contract for sale of land, 
the purchaser "acquires all of the incidents of ownership except legal title... .[and]... 
is therefore in equity properly regarded as the owner of the property." Jelco. Inc. v. 
Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739, 745 (1973). 
[Ojrdinarily, the purchaser is entitled to any benefit that may accrue to the 
property and must also bear any loss or depreciation to the property, 
absent the vendor's fault or negligence. 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser 
§295. The purchaser bears such risks, based on the principle of 
equitable ownership, even when the vendor retains possession of the 
property subject to a conveyance at some later date. 
Utah State Medical Ass'n v. Utah State Employees Credit Union. 655 P.2d 643, 644 
(Utah 1982) citing as support Jelco. Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 
511 P.2d 739, 741 (1973), and 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor and Purchaser §357. 
In Jelco. Inc. v. Third Judicial Dist. Court. 29 Utah 2d 472, 511 P.2d 739 (1973) 
the Jeremys were sellers of a tract of land in Salt Lake. The tract was divided in 11 
separate parcels with deeds for the parcels placed in escrow, and as each annual 
payment was made, a particular parcel was to be delivered to the purchaser. With four 
annual payments still to be made, part of the tract of land was condemned by the City 
of Salt Lake for expansion of the municipal airport. The City deposited 1.4 million 
dollars in court and the buyer's assignee, Jelco, disputed Jeremys' entitlement to any 
of the 1.4 million dollars. The trial court found that Jeremys were entitled to a portion of 
the 1.4 million and Jelco appealed. The Utah Supreme Court stated the general rule 
to be applied in such cases: 
In such an executory contract the vendee acquires all of the incidents of 
ownership except legal title. He is therefore in equity properly regarded 
as the owner of the property. Thus, in the absence of an agreement to 
the contrary, where a condemnor takes land [which is] subject to an 
executory contract, it is the vendee who is normally entitled to any 
condemnation award for the land so taken. It is he who is entitled to the 
benefit of any increase and who must bear the detriment of any 
decrease, in the value of the property; whereas, the vendor has only 
legal title. In regard to the purchase price, what he is entitled to is to have 
it paid in accordance with the terms of the contract. He is of course also 
entitled to retain the legal title as security for its performance, and in case 
of default, to seek the remedies provided therein. 
Id- at 475. 
In summary, the Agreement for sale of the Property transferred the risk of loss to 
Sevy and his successor in interest Brian High, because the purchaser acquires "all of 
the incidents of title" and "bears the detriments" caused by condemnation actions. The 
Town of Brian Head's two condemnation actions were commenced after the 
Agreement was entered into and the "incidents of ownership" had passed to Sevy and 
subsequently to its successor in interest Brian High. Tersely stated, it was Brian Highfs 
problem that the Town wished to condemn the water rights—not R.D.'s. Brian High 
bears the detriment of a condemnation action—not R.D. Brian High was not justified in 
refusing to pay the payments to R.D. when due. 
POINT III THE STATE WATER ENGINEER WAS NOT INVOLVED IN 
ANY ADJUDICATIVE CAPACITY BUT MERELY 
PROVIDED EVIDENCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS 
AND INFORMATION 
In its brief, Brian High claims that the trial court allowed the State Water 
Engineer to determine the water rights issue before the court. This is a complete 
mischaracterization of the role the Affidavit of the State Water Engineer filed in the 
summary judgment proceedings in the instant case. 
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First, it was Brian High's argument to the court that the State Water Engineer 
would clarify whether the water was in dispute. Brian High further urged that the State 
Water Engineer would be "expert enough to tell us whether the water can properly be 
transferred." It was Brian High's proffer of evidence of what the State Water Engineer 
would say that precipitated the Affidavit being obtained from the State Water Engineer. 
The transcript of the second to the last hearing on the summary judgment motion on 
June 5, 1990, is, in pertinent part: 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: * * * And that — what I intend to do is just call 
somebody [at trial] from the state engineer's office to determine the status 
of the water. I also — 
THE COURT: So you're not relying on any representations to Mr. 
Nichols at the time of the signing of the contract? 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: I don't think Mr. Nichols can testify — I think he 
can testify concerning the representations made by Mr. Wade's clients, 
but I don't think that he'd be expert enough to determine whether that 
water can properly be transferred and used by us. And we wouldn't rely 
on him for that. 
* * * * 
THE COURT: And you intend to present evidence from the state 
engineer that, in fact, those water rights are tied up in litigation? Is that 
basically it? 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: Basically when the trial is set, it's our intention 
to subpoena him and ask him those questions. 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: I don't know. The only thing I know is that — is 
that the office of the state engineer has not decided that those are not in 
dispute. And that's basically where they tell us what we can do with the 
type of water. * * * And what the state engineer has said — and it's my 
understanding will say — is that this is called Salt Palace [sic] Springs 
[sic], and 1104 is the diligence claim number. In his interrogatories, he 
says that's in dispute — that water is in dispute. And we think we're 
entitled to a trial on the issue to determine whether it's in dispute. And if it 
is, we think we're entitled to rescission.72 
R. Vol. II, p. 544; June 5th Hearing Transcript, p. 14 
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At the final hearing on the summary judgment motion on June 19th, counsel for Brian 
High stated: 
MR. PARK [Brian High]: At the last hearing, I represented to the Court 
that there was a dispute concerning the water, and that the only 
one that could answer that dispute was the state engineer. And 
after Mr. Wade and I talked to the engineer and reviewed what he 
would say in his Affidavit, it was my opinion that maybe the Court 
would determine that the two acre feet in dispute was not a 
substantial breach of this contract; so, I didn't want to 
misrepresent anything to the Court, and that's why I don't object to 
this reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment.73 
Brian High first urges that the State Water Engineer is the answer to the entire dispute 
and now he urges the courts not to rely on the State Water Engineer. 
Second, the State Water Engineer acted in the capacities of an administrative 
record-keeper and an expert witness, not as an adjudicator. The State Water 
Engineer was asked to state what amount of water of Diligence Claim 1104 was to be 
transferred by the Agreement and what amount of appurtenant water was subject to 
the General Adjudication. The State Water Engineer gave that information based on 
his administrative records, and his engineering expertise. He did not pretend to act in 
any judicial capacity or to issue a decision as to the parties' rights. The Affidavit of the 
State Water Engineer was not "res judicata" on the issue of ownership nor did it 
attempt to resolve any dispute as to the water included in the Property, regardless of 
Brian High's claims to the contrary. 
The State Water Engineer stated that there were less than two-acre feet of the 
stockwatering rights pertaining to the Property still involved in the General 
Adjudication and that in his opinion the stockwatering rights were validly acquired by 
diligence use. The State Water Engineer was relying on administrative records in his 
office as well as his speaking as an expert when he stated that in his opinion, the 
stockwatering rights were valid. Experts are entitled to state their opinions. 
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Furthermore, the trial court judge did not enter an adjudication of water rights or 
quiet title decree based on the information from the State Water Engineer. The judge 
simply found, based in part on the State Water Engineer's information, that the less-
than-two-acre-feet of stockwatering rights involved in the General Adjudication did not 
preclude summary judgment because that small amount was an immaterial fact, and 
that Brian High's default was not justified because the bargained for "appurtenant" 
water rights existed. 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to grant the motion for summary 
judgment, it appearing that there's no material issue of fact that 
has been raised by the defense — or by the defendants to that 
motion for summary judgment. It appears that the — the land was 
transferred with appurtenant water rights, and the evidence shows 
that appurtenant water rights are available. And there's no 
legitimate dispute as to how much those — or the quantity of water 
that was involved. * * * *74 
POINT IV IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE COURT TO 
DETERMINE THE EXACT AMOUNT OF WATER NOR TO 
DO MORE THAN IT HAS DONE 
It is not necessary for the trial court to determine the exact quantity of 
"appurtenant" water included in the Property nor does the trial court need to quiet title 
in any party. As argued herein, the term "appurtenant" identifies R.D.'s clear intent that 
R.D. intended to transfer its interest in the water, belonging to and being used in 
connection with the land subject to the specific exclusions and reservations. By the 
use of the term "appurtenant," R.D. was not attempting to quantify the water being 
transferred with the Property. Essentially, as the judge stated in the final hearing, R.D. 
promised "appurtenant water" and there was "appurtenant water" available for transfer. 
The specific quantity was immaterial. 
Furthermore, R.D. has not claimed ownership to any amount of water beyond 
that appurtenant water which it intended to transfer under the Agreement. To create a 
need for a quiet title action, at least two parties would need to raise conflicting claims 
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of ownership in the same rights, whether land or property. Brian High is alone in its 
claims of conflicting ownership interests. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee requests that the decision of the trial court to 
enter summary judgment against Brian High and in favor of R.D. be affirmed. 
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